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REVIE W ARTICL E
Measuring economic performance
and social progress
TIM LEUNIG
London School of Economics, T.Leunig@lse.ac.uk
In February 2008, French President Nicholas Sarkozy created a committee
with a somewhat ungainly name, ‘The Commission on the Measurement of
Economic Performance and Social Progress’, headed by Joseph Stiglitz, and
advised by Amartya Sen. The aim of the Commission was to ‘identify the
limits of GDP as an indicator of economic performance and social progress,
including the problems with its measurement; to consider what additional
information might be required for the production of more relevant indicators
of social progress; to assess the feasibility of alternative measurement tools,
and to discuss how to present the statistical information in an appropriate
way’ (p. 7).
The Report aims to speak to political leaders, policymakers, the academic
community (in particular statisticians) and civil society organisations. The
Report itself is lengthy, running to 292 pages. This includes a 12-page
executive summary, a ‘short narrative’ of around 60 pages, followed by
approximately 200 pages of ‘substantial arguments’. Both the short narrative
and the substantial arguments are divided into three chapters, the first
dealing with classical GDP issues, the second with the quality of life, and the
third with sustainable development and the environment. The first two are
of greatest potential interest to economic historians and are covered here.
Given that the Commission was created by the French government, it
is dominated to a surprising extent by Americans. Of the 24 members of
the Commission, 13 were based at universities or other organisations in the
United States, seven in French institutions, three in British universities, and
one from an Indian university. That said, the people selected to some extent
come from ‘the left’, at least in so far as they are not market fundamentalists.
For example, the three British representatives, Tony Atkinson, Andrew
Oswald and Nick Stern, are all associated in diﬀerent ways with challenges
to economic orthodoxy.
The Report trots out all the standard lines. What we measure aﬀects what
we do. There is a diﬀerence between oﬃcial measurements of key indicators,
and widespread perceptions. Aggregates hide inequality. Depreciation and
environmental damage are poorly captured. The Report also makes claims
that not everyone will accept: ‘we are facing a looming environmental crisis’
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(p. 9), although, to be fair, the Report acknowledges that not even every
member of the Commission agreed with that statement. It also argues that
‘those attempting to guide the economy and our societies are like pilots trying
to steer a course without a reliable compass’ (p. 9).
The Report makes a number of recommendations, and it is on these
that it will ultimately be judged. It asks for a greater emphasis on income
and consumption, rather than on production, with greater weight on the
experience of individual households rather than the economy as a whole, and
on wealth as well as income. It argues for greater emphasis on inequality, and
the inclusion of nonmarket activities. It argues that we should devote greater
eﬀort to looking at issues such as social connections, political voice, and
insecurity as other aspects of the quality of life. It argues that both objective
and subjective wellbeing are important, and that surveys are a good way of
finding out about wellbeing. Finally, it argues that sustainability requires
what it describes as a ‘dashboard of indicators’, which would include atmo-
spheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, and depletion of fishing stocks.
At one level this Report is correct. Gross domestic product is the most
widely used measure of economic activity, and it has any number of flaws. It
does only measure market production, it does use market prices rather than
taking into account consumer surplus or externalities. It is poor at coping
with quality changes, particularly in services.
And yet in another level, this Report manages to be both correct and
pointless. In my time I have met many politicians, many policymakers,
many in the academic community including statisticians and any number
of representatives of civil society organisations. And in all of that time I have
never met a single person who felt that their job was to maximise GDP or
GDP per head. Every single person from all of these categories that I have
ever met has understood, implicitly as much as explicitly, that GDP is not
the be all and end all of success. Indeed, many years ago I was at a political
meeting in which someone in the audience accused politicians of being
obsessed simply with GDP per head. One of the politicians on the platform –
now a member of the British Cabinet – replied that this was self-evident
nonsense. He listed a whole range of policies that would raise income per
head, but which were completely unthinkable. He pointed out that if we were
really dedicated to raising GDP per head we would favour euthanasia for
almost all old people, since the vast majority of old people have income lower
than the national average. Indeed, he went further and pointed out that since
we can predict with a moderate degree of accuracy someone’s likely income
by the time they start school, any government truly dedicated to maximising
GDP per head would start its euthanasia programme at the preschool level.
He went on to list a huge range of other policies that we actually enact that
clearly reduce measured GDP per head. Planning laws that protect green
spaces are one example. Legislation that governs maximum pollution levels
from factories is another.
Measuring economic performance and social progress 359
In modern democratic societies rises in income per head are a useful
summary measure of economic development. We know that in the last couple
of years the fall in GDP per head has measured something very real: a
recession. We also know that the rise in GDP in the previous decade also
measured something very real: a boom. Anyone with any understanding of
the nature of economic development could have predicted that the boom
would be followed by a slump, but no one if they are honest could predict
with any reliability the exact point at which boom would turn to bust, or the
depth or duration of the recession. We have not had the current recession
because we failed to follow the sort of advice given by this Commission; we
have had the current recession because cyclicality is part of the nature of
the economic system. What the Commission emphatically does not make
clear is what decisions politicians made in the absence of this Commission’s
Report, that they would not have made had they read this Report.
Indeed, where the Report makes very specific recommendations it
should worry citizens were they to be followed. Let us take the very first
recommendation that is made: to emphasise national accounts aggregates
other than GDP (section 3, pp. 23–30). In this section the authors make
a number of sensible points. They note that we should consider the
depreciation of capital goods. But for the vast majority of countries the
ratio between net national disposable income – their preferred measure –
and gross domestic product is well within the margins of error of being a
constant over time. France and the United States are given as examples of
exactly this. In the case in Ireland, however, the figures are very diﬀerent,
and the Report is right that the figures for net national disposable income
demonstrate that the ‘Celtic Tiger’ was to some extent a fiction. Clearly,
for Ireland this paragraph of the Report is worth reading, but for citizens in
most countries it will make very little diﬀerence.
Second, the Report calls for improving the measurement of the quality of
services. And yet, as they note, ‘it is diﬃcult even to define’ things such as
the ‘general service level of the staﬀ, choice and presentation of products and
so forth’ (p. 26). Too true! Of course, we can point to some aspects in which
quality appears to have declined: Ryanair has removed the seat back pocket
from its planes, for example, and casual empiricism seems to suggest that
for those of us who travel economy class, legroom is in ever shorter supply
(for those who travel at the front of the plane, the development of flat beds
represents a major step forward on long-haul flights). But taken as a whole it
seems at least plausible that the level of service, the presentation of products,
and so on and so forth has risen broadly in line with GDP. It would certainly
take some evidence to the contrary before I at least would be willing to spend
serious amounts of government money working out alternative indicators in
this area. Equally, the Report is correct to note that the United States spends
more per capita on healthcare than most other countries, and that measuring
output by input, as is common in healthcare, does not give a sensible result.
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But what the Report fails to do is tell us how to better measure the output
of government-provided services such as healthcare. Again, it suggests that
surveys may be a useful way forward, but I am pretty sceptical of people’s
ability to rate the quality of medical care on a sort of ‘trip advisor’ scale. My
daughter was cured of juvenile idiopathic arthritis, a relatively rare condition.
Even though I have read much of the medical literature on juvenile idiopathic
arthritis, and even though I attended a conference on child rheumatology, I
still have no sensible method of assessing whether the time it took to diagnose
my daughter represented a good performance, an average performance, or
a poor performance either in the light of UK NHS expenditure in general,
UK NHS expenditure on child rheumatology, or in the light of global best
practice. And yet if I cannot do it for as straightforward a surgical procedure
as this, having read widely on the subject, what hope is there to assess
healthcare by consumer surveys internationally?
Third, the Report argues that we should focus on household consumption,
rather than total final consumption. They note that this would exclude
things such as prisons, military expenditure and the clean-up of oil spills.
This is perhaps the most bizarre recommendation of all. It implies that
the provision of prisons, military expenditure and the clean-up of oil spills
have no beneficial eﬀects on human welfare. A government setting out to
maximise household consumption should therefore imprison no one, spend
nothing on the military and ignore any oil spills that occur. Writing this
review in the summer of 2010, having seen Barack Obama’s opinion poll
ratings plunge in response to the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, I am sceptical
that ignoring oil spills is actually what citizens want. I am equally certain that
citizens gain some utility from knowing that people who might be dangerous
are locked up, and that countries that might attack them are deterred, and
can be repulsed if necessary. That is not to say that the specific levels of
expenditure on prisons or defence are always appropriate, but to say that
expenditure on these things should be excluded from some measure that
aims to capture the welfare of citizens is positively bizarre.
Fourth, this section of the Report calls for income to be considered in
conjunction with wealth. It argues that ‘wealth is an important indicator
of the sustainability of actual consumption’. The problem is that wealth is
extremely hard to measure. The Report acknowledges that human capital
is hard to measure, and that for many people the skills they have are their
single most important asset. This is particularly true for young people, and
it is almost impossible to see how this measure of wealth could really be
incorporated with any degree of reliability. Furthermore, assets for which
there exist markets are likely to be valued at market rates. Here the problem
is that we may be in danger of emphasising booms even more prominently.
In the 10 years leading up to the most recent recession, for example, shares
and particularly house prices rose really rather rapidly in Anglo-Saxon
economies. It is easy to dismiss this in retrospect as a bubble (although
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as British property prices have barely fallen, the evidence for a bubble is
easy to contest), but there is little doubt that at the time people felt that
these rises in asset prices were securely underpinned and should be seen as
legitimate. Were the British and American economies to have followed the
recommendations of this Report, therefore, there is a danger that they would
have been even more confident five years ago about the sustainability of the
economic models that they were then pursuing.
Fifth, the Report urges a greater consideration of the diﬀerences between
mean and median incomes. There is no doubt that writing an economic
history of the postwar world using the median rather than the mean gives
a diﬀerent picture, particularly over the last 30 years. Yet this is surely well
understood by all commentators, and above all by politicians who, more
than anyone, know that they have to deliver for the average person. Political
scientists have median voter models, not mean voter models.
Finally, this section of the Report calls for greater emphasis on including
nonmarket activities, including both domestic production and leisure. It
presents hypothetical examples to show that moving to a world in which we
pay people to do our cleaning, and make our sandwiches, will overstate the
rise in national income. Against that, the rise in leisure time in those countries
over time means that we are understating the rise in national income. The net
direction of bias is not apparent. It notes that these things are very diﬃcult to
do, that existing estimates are imprecise, and that ‘only if there is suﬃcient
confidence in extended measures of income will there be a broader take-up
by statistical oﬃces’ (p. 38). This is surely correct, and that confidence is
unlikely to be forthcoming.
Economic historians are concerned with the quality of life, as much
as with material economic progress. This is also an important part of
the Commission’s Report. The Commission argues that measures such as
the human development index should not replace conventional economic
indicators, but instead ‘provide an opportunity to enrich policy discussions
and to inform people’s view of the conditions of the communities where
they live’ (p. 41, italics in the original). The Report argues that there are
three useful definitions of the quality of life. The first one is subjective:
do individuals say that they are satisfied with their life? The second builds
on the notion of capabilities, while the third is based on the notion of ‘fair
allocations’ (p. 42). This section is characterised by a very sensible discussion
of the issues, followed by relatively limited recommendations.
The first recommendation is simply that larger-scale oﬃcial surveys should
be taken of people’s self-reported happiness, their hedonic experiences and
their priorities. The British government already does this, and in the light
of the Report’s own acceptance that people in diﬀerent countries have
radically diﬀerent preferences (p. 48), it is hard to imagine that these sorts
of surveys can be standardised internationally in a useful way, in the manner
of standardised national accounts that underpin GDP estimates.
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The second recommendation is that objective measurement of people’s
health, education, personal activities, political voice, social connections,
environmental conditions and insecurity should be undertaken. Whilst
measures of people’s health and education are relatively straightforward
and already undertaken, it is hard to see how objective measures can be
taken of people’s personal activities, political voice and social connections.
The Report also needs to think through the potential conflict between this
recommendation and the previous one. It may well be that our environmental
conditions are ‘objectively’ declining, in so far as global warming is a real
threat to our standard of living. But it is equally clear that a large number
of people think that global warming is a myth, or that in so far as it is not a
myth it is a simple natural phenomenon that we should ignore. Subjectively
these people derive no disutility from global warming, even if ‘objectively’
they are worse oﬀ. Or, were we to find that global warming is a problem
that solves itself, or turned out not to exist, then there will have existed
people who subjectively felt much worse oﬀ, who were scared for the future
of our planet, but who ‘objectively’ had nothing to fear. We do not know
which of these two scenarios is correct, and nor do we know how we should
reconceptualise our understanding of living standards and the quality of
life even were we to know which scenario was correct. The balancing of
subjective and objective measures in understanding people’s wellbeing is
very diﬃcult, and the Report of the Commission does not take us very far in
understanding this issue.
The Report’s third recommendation in the quality of life section is that
quality of life indicators should always include inequality of the various
measures being looked at. Thus we should not only look at inequality of
income, but we should also look at inequality in education, health, social
connections, environmental conditions and so on. No evidence is oﬀered
that inequality along these dimensions is radically diﬀerent from income
inequality. Furthermore, the Report argues that inequality across these
dimensions should be assessed not just across people, as individuals, but also
across socio-economic groups, and across generations. It argues, although
without a strong philosophical backing, for special attention to inequalities
that have arisen more recently, such as those linked to immigration. Why a
massively entrenched inequality, which has persisted for generations, should
be treated less seriously than one that has recently arisen, it is not clear.
Finally, it calls for statistical oﬃces to release information in such a way
that other researchers can aggregate the information in diﬀerent ways to
produce diﬀerent indices. At one level this request is unobjectionable, but
at another it seems to risk undoing the central objective of the Commission.
If there are a myriad of diﬀerent indicators, some of them going up, and
some of them going down, some of them showing that Britain is a better
place to live in than France, others of them showing the reverse, then it is
really unlikely that any of these indicators are going to gain the salience of
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GDP per head. There are many indicators out there already, and one of
the great attractions of GDP per head, for policymakers and civil society, is
that it is widely understood and widely respected. It is not perfect, but we
know its flaws. In suggesting that we create a myriad of diﬀerent alternative
indices, the Commission risks handing victory back to GDP per head, by
default. That is surely not the intention, but it is a risk of this particular
recommendation.
Economic historians are busy people. We have research to do, classes to
teach, scripts to mark. There are referee’s reports to write, books to review,
and references on students to produce. Our time is limited, and valuable.
The Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance
and Social Progress is mildly interesting, but oﬀers little by way of value to
economic historians. It does not give alternative counterfactuals over time
of how diﬀerent societies have performed according to diﬀerent indices.
It makes no case that, taken as a whole, changes in GDP per head either
overestimate or underestimate ‘economic performance and social progress’,
or that that measure is more or less accurate for diﬀerent countries or for
diﬀerent time periods. Instead, it has a wish list of things that individually
might well be quite nice, but which collectively do not add up to a research
agenda, either for current economists or for economic historians, and which
do not collectively add up to any coherent alternative vision of how economic
performance and social progress should be measured. Economic historians
are likely to have better things to do with their time than to read this Report.
